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Abstract
Bringing the United States and major developing  mitigation  for all parties  are very sensitive to uncertainty,
countries to control their greenhouse  gas emissions will  and in some scenarios very large.  This constitutes a
be the  key challenge  for the international  climate regime  strong barrier against adopting any of these  schemes if
beyond the Kyoto Protocol.  But in the current quantity-  no additional  mechanism  is introduced to limit the
based coordination, large  uncertainties surrounding  uncertainty  on costs.
future  emissions and future abatement opportunities  On the other hand,  parties'  preferred  (least-cost)  rules
make  the costs of any commitment  very  difficult to assess  are essentially  robust  to uncertainty.  And although these
ex ante, hence a strong risk  that the negotiation will be  preferences differ across countries,  the authors'  analysis
stalled.  suggest some bargaining is possible if developing
Lecocq  and Crassous  use a partial equilibrium  model  countries make a commitment and join the allowance
of the international  allowance  market to quantify the  market earlier  in exchange for tighter  quotas in  the
economic consequences  of the main post-Kyoto quota  North. This underscores  the importance  of the rules
allocation  rules proposed in  the literature  and to assess  governing the entry of new  parties into the coordination.
how robust these consequences  are to uncertainty  on  But the magnitude  of the win-win potential strongly
future  population, economic,  and emissions  growth.  depends on how different abatement  costs are assumed
They confirm that,  regardless of the rule selected, the  to be between industrial and developing countries, and
prices of allowances and the net costs of climate  on how long that gap is assumed to persist.
This paper-a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the
group to assess policies for mitigating climate change.  Copies of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818
H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Viktor Soukhanov,  room MC2-205, telephone 202-473-5721,  fax
202-522-3230,  email address vsoukhanov@worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Working Papers are also posted on the Web
at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  flecocq@worldbank.org  or crassous@centre-cired.fr.
March  2003.  (39 pages)International climate regime beyond 2012
Are quota allocation rules robust to uncertainty?
Franck Lecocq,  Renaud Crassous
World Banl4, Development Economic Research Group, Infrastructure  and  Environment
1818 HSt NW Washington DC  20433 USA
Centre  International  de Recherche sur I 'Environnement  et le Developpement, EHESS, CNRS
45 bis Avenue de la Belle Gabrielle,  F-94  736 Nogent sur  Mamne CEDEX, France
1.  Introduction
Under  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  OECD  countries  and  economies  in  transition,  the  so-called  Annex  B
countries,  have accepted  binding greenhouse gases (GHG) emission targets for period 2008-2012, or first
commitment  period.  Developing countries  have  no  such commitment,  but may host emission reduction
projects through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
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in the World Bank Policy Research Working Paper serie.
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Though  consistent  with  the "common  but differentiated responsibilities" principle  of the  1992  UN
Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change  (UNFCCC),  this  partial  coordination  remains  largely  an
"unfinished business" (Jacoby et al.,  1999).  In fact,  Annex  B countries minus  the United  States  (which
has decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol) represent  only a third of current World emissions'. In other
words, to meet the UNFCCC's objective to "stabilize greenhouse gas  concentrations  in the atmosphere at
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic  interference with the climate system", participation
of the United  States  and of major  emitters  among  developing  countries  is required.  This  is  the main
challenge of the post-2012 international climate mitigation regime.
There are strong reasons to believe that this regime could replicate the current cap-and-trade  approach.
In fact, the majority of the early GHG mitigation  policies,  such as the trading schemes in Denmark and
the UK or the intra-firm trading within Shell  and BP are based on that model  (Rosenzweig  et al., 2002).
In addition,  some provisions of the Kyoto Protocol  such as the possibility of banking allowances already
assume a second commitment  period. The now likely2 entry into force of the Protocol  will also result in
the creation of specific  institutions such as national registry  systems or market clearinghouses.  Combined
with  the  traditional  inertia  of the  diplomatic  process,  all  these  elements  create  strong  incentives  to
perpetuate current status quo. In the present paper, we assume cap-and-trade  is replicated.
As pointed out by Weitzman (1974), in a quantity-based coordination,  all the uncertainty falls on costs.
In  the  climate  mitigation  case,  this  difficulty  is  magnified:  business-as-usual  scenarios  and  future
abatement  costs are by definition unobservable,  and margin of errors are  potentially very  large. There is
thus a strong risk that the negotiation be stalled as no Party wishes to commit to such uncertain agreement
(Hourcade,  1994).  This hypothesis  is unfortunately  confirmed  by the  vagaries  of the  Kyoto Protocol,
where uncertainties  on costs have fueled the United States and other Nations'  deep skepticism (Nordhaus,
1998, Victor, 2001, Hourcade and Ghersi, 2002).
The  present  paper  aims  at  assessing  the  extent  to  which  future  negotiations  mnight  face  the  same
difficulty,  by  quantifying the impact  of uncertainty  on the distributional  outcome  of the various  quota
allocation rules proposed to guide the distribution of allowances beyond 2012. That will provide us with
some  insights  on  how  Parties,  in  particular  developing  countries,  might  rank  rules  in the  incoming
negotiations on future commitments  (2005).
To do  so,  we  first survey  the  main quota  allocation  rules  that have  been proposed  in the  literature
(Section  2).  Second,  we  develop  a partial  equilibrium model  of the  allowance  market,  which  aims at
simulating  the  economic  consequences  of the  adopted  rules  (Section  3),  under  a  wide  range  of
assumptions  about  population,  economic  and  emission  growth  in  the  baseline  scenario  described  in
section 4. After having ensured  all the quota allocation rules yielded the same cumulative  emission level
in the long run (section 5), we successively analyze how baseline imnpact on quota distribution (section 6),
price  of allowances  (7)  and  regional  costs  and  benefits  of the  climate  policy  (8).  The  last  section
concludes by discussing the implications of these results for the design of the international regime beyond
2012.
1  Fossil-fuel CO 2 only. Covemge would reach 56% with the USA (EA,  2001). Even if  the emissions of  current Annex B
plus the USA were curbed down to zero in 2010, concentrations  would still be on the rise beyond 2100 in most business-
as-usual scenarios because of emissions  from developing countries.
2 To enter into force, the Kyoto Protocol must be ratified by 55% of the Parties,  accounting for more than 55% of the
1990 emissions  of Annex B. The  former  condition is  already met,  but the latter requires  Russia and either  Canada or
Poland to ratify. Russia and Canada have declared  they would mtify at the Johannesburg summit, but neither has done so
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2.  A survey of main quota allocadon  ruales
Several  schemes - commonly  referred to as "quota allocation  rules" - have  been proposed to guide a
quantity based regime  beyond 2012.  They define  both principles  for the allocation  of quotas to Parties
and, perhaps more importantly, a timetable for developing countries to take on binding targee.
These  proposals  are  usually  designed  to  apply  not  only  to  the  second  (2013-2017),  but  also  to
subsequent commitment periods. This is a rather good proxy for the negotiations to come (negotiations on
the second  commitment  period  are  scheduled  for 2005),  as  Parties,  developing  countries  in particular,
have expressed strong desire for visibility on these periods before they take on any firm commitment4.
Some  of these  schemes  are  ready-to-implement,  while  others just outline  grand  principles,  leaving
operational  details unresolved.  To ensure consistency in the modeling exercises we describe all  the rules
through  the  template  represented  in  Figure  1 below.  We  denote  "observable  parameters"  all  the
measurable  parameters,  which  be  used  or  computing  quotas.  Though  the  list  is  virtually  infinite,  an
international  agreement can realistically be based only on those of these parameters on the value of which
there  is enough confidence  is  almost all countries  so that endless  controversies  can be avoided.  Only  a
handfil of parameters such as population, GDP or GHG emissions thus qualify 5.
Observable pa  etes  List of counties  th
Rule  tagetes
Negotiable parameters  GIHG Emiisson
Target
Figure  1: Generic  structure of  quota allocatfion rules
By "negotiable  parameters",  we denote  the normative  parameters  which enter as input to the formula
computing quota, and on which  Parties would have  to negotiate  and agree on.  Examples  of negotiable
parameters  include  GDP per capita thresholds  below which Parties do not have to have a constraint  on
their emissions, weights of attached to different parameters  in a multi-criteria  allocation rules or year at
which a certain goal (e.g. per capita  allocation of quotas) has to be achieved.
We  now  present  the  main  quota  allocation  rules  suggested  in  the  liteature,  starting  somewhat
arbitrarily from the simplest schemes  (in terms of volumne of observable parameters  required) to the most
complex.  Section 2.1 presents the grandfathering  schemes, section 2.2 the polar per capita  allocation and
2.3  the  various  schemes  that  have  been proposed  to  combine  the  two  approaches.  We  then  review
approaches  based  on  other  parameters  such  as  ability  to  pay  (2.4),  opportunity  to  abate  (2.5)  and
3To the authors'  knowledge,  all  proposals  for a  quantity-based  coordination  beyond  Kyoto assume  that  the  Parties
would allocate allowances among themselves  firely. Auctioning these rights does not seem to be discusse
4 China and the G77 have warned that "there would be no agreement on carbon trading  until the question of  emissions
righ*s and  entitlements is addressed  equitablV' (UNFCCC document SB/1998/MISC.I/Add.3/Rev.1).
Some  international  sharing  agreements  are based  on more complex parameters,  for example the Country Policy and
Insfitutional Assessment evaluation for IDA allocation.  But this is feasible only when one group of Party (here the lenders)
has the final authority on the value of these parameters.4  Lecocq and Crassous  /International Climate  Regime beyond 2012
responsibility  in historic emissions  (2.6).  We last  discuss the  so-called "bottom-up"  approaches  where
national quotas are built by aggregation of sectoral targets (2.7).
2.1.  Grandfathering (flatrate)
In  this  scheme,  allowances  are distributed pro rata past  emission levels.  This  is  the most  common
approach in international  sharing agreements over scarce resources, which reflects widespread acceptance
of the legal doctrine of prior appropriation  (Sterner, 2002). Examples  include the milk quotas within the
European Union (Burton,  1985), most Individual Tradable Quotas for fisheries  (Sterner, 2002, p.382-383)
and,  to  some degree  at least,  the US  SO 2 trading program  (Joskow et al.,  1999). In the climate  change
affairs,  the 1992 non-binding  target to curve 2000 GHG emissions down to 1990 levels (UNFCCC, 1992)
reflected this logic that was, to a certain extent, followed at Kyoto since the three major groups of emitters
in Annex B (US, EU and Japan) have similar absolute targets compared to 1990 emissions (-6%, -8%  and
-7% respectively).  We will consider here a simple flat rate architecture.
In this scheme, the policy parameters  are a reference year and a rate of  emission reduction compared to
that reference  for each commitment  period.  The  only  negotiable  parameters  are  the volumes  of GHG
emissions  at  the  reference  year.  The  formula  itself is  very  simple,  with c  indexing  countries,  and  t
indexing successive commitment periods.
Quota(c,t) = Reference  year emissions  (c) * Reduction rate (t)  (1)
To control  the timing of entry of developing countries,  we introduce trigger  mechanism based on per
capita GDP.  As  soon  as  the country  GDP  exceeds  a  given threshold,  it  is  given  an  emission  quota.
Otherwise, it has no constraint on its GHG emissions.
2.2.  Immediate per capita allocation (Agarwal and Narain's proposal)
In  a  resounding  1991  paper,  Anil  Agarwal  and  Sunita Narain  proposed  an  immediate  per capita
allocation of GHG emnission rights, which they presented as the only equitable way of allocating ernission
quotas among countries.  It is beyond the scope of this-paper to discuss the nornative foundations of this
claim (see e.g.  Godard,  2000 for a review), but we must note that per capita allocation appeals to many
participants of the climate policy debate (e.g. Baer et al., 2000, Blanchard et al., 2000).
In this  scheme,  the only  negotiable  parameter  is  a per capita emission  quota  for  each period.  Last
measured population level is the observable, with the following simple formula:
Quota(c,t) = Population (c,t-l) * Per capita  emission quota (t)  (2)
Since current per capita emissions across countries are very different (see Table I below), this formula
might generate  large  quantities of so-called hot air, "windfall credits"  or quotas in excess from baseline
scenarios  in  developing  countries.  To safeguard  the environmental  integrity of the trading  mechanism,
some restrictions  on the trade of hot air might be introduced.  The variants  with progressive  rather than
immediate per capita  allocation are discussed separately below.
2.3.  Transitions from grandfathering toper capita
Although per capita  allocation has strong normative appeal, an immediate application of this scheme is
often  regarded  as  unrealistic  in  terms  of political  acceptability  and economic  feasibility.  As Table  I
indicates, per capita emissions today are  indeed  very unequal  among countries.  To solve  this dilemma,Lecocq, Crassous  /lnternational  Climate regime beyond 2012  5
progressive  approaches have been proposed whereby quotas are  first allocated based on past emissions,
and then gradually based on population6.
Nunerous transition  schemes have been proposed  (e.g. Manne  and Richels,  1997,  French proposal  to
the AGBM7,  1996). Key parameters  are the date at which convergence  is effective,  and the form of the
transition. We choose to illustrate  this group with the contraction and convergence  proposal of the Global
Common  Institute  (Meyer,  2000),  in  which total  allowed  emissions  and  sharing principles  are clearly
separated. In this scheme, a total authorized emission level is set for each commitment period.  Shares of
that quota are then computed as follows:
Party  Per  capita
(tclcap)
United States*  5.48













Saudi Arabia  3.56
Islamic Rep. of hran  1.14
Indonesia  0.28
North Korea  2.35
Taiwan  2.45
Turkey  0.79
World average  1.06
Table 1: 1998 Per capitafossil-fuel  CO2 emissionsfor top 20 emitters (source: IEA,  2001).
6  Interestingly,  transition  towards per capita allocation  appears  in  the recent  Marakesh  Accords  (2001),  in  a draft
decision  /CP7  titled Principles, nature and scope of the mechanisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto
Protocol. Sixth  preambula  in  this  decision  reads  "Emphasizing that the Parties included in Annex I shall implement
domestic action 1..]  with a view  to reducing emissions in a manner conducive to narrowing  per capita differences
between developed and developing country Parties while working towards achievement of the ultimate objective of the
Convention". Although  we understand this statement does not  preclude the choice  Parties  will make when they have  to
negotiate actual  allocations by 2005, it demnonstrates  the widespread interest that transitions towards per capita  allocation
commands.
' The first Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC created the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate  (AGBM) in  1995
to discuss quota allocation in the future Kyoto Protocol.6  Lecocq and Crassous  /International  Climate  Regime beyond 2012
Pop(c,t-1)  Ouota(c,t-1)  )_(0vF6er
Quota(c,t) = World Quota(t)  *  World Pop(ct.1) - World Quota(t)1)) e - C  F  Y  t)
Quota(c,t-1)  1
+ World Quota(c,t-1)j  (3)
(Quota(c,t-1) is replaced by Emissions(c,t-1) in thefirst  period)
The initial shares are thus based on previous period emissions. But as time goes by, the weight attached
to  the share  of population  increases.  When  the convergence  year  is reached,  shares of the  quota  are
uniquely based on relative populations, as in the per capita  approach.
Negotiable  parameters  include  world emission  quota at  each  period,  a reference  year  for historical
emissions,  a convergence  year  and a speed of convergence  represented by parameter  a. The higher this
parameter,  the  slower  the  convergence.  Observable  parameters  include  population  and reference  year
GHG emissions. No transition scheme  is proposed since the rule is by itself a transition.  Potential variants
include  others  convergence  formula  (e.g.  linear  transition).  As  the  immediate  per capita approach,
contraction  and convergence  may  generate  "windfall  credits',  especially  in the  medium and long run
when quota allocation become strongly dependent on population.
2A.  Ablity to pay (Proposal by Jacoby, Schiamensee  and VWng)
A  large  body  of literature  argues  for  allocating  quotas  in  function  of the  ability  to  pay.  Various
proposals  by  Parties  prior  to Kyoto  already  made  that  argument  (e.g.  submissions  by  Poland,  1997,
Estonia,  1996, Russia,  1995 or South  Korea,  1997  to the Ad hoc Group  of the Berlin Mandate7). The
proposal by Henry Jacoby et aL  (1999) is an operational  scheme based on the same principle.
In  this proposal,  countries  take  on  emission  targets  when  they  cross  a predefined per capita GDP
threshold. At first, their emissions are capped but still allowed to grow, but the richer they get, the tighter
the constraint becomes up to a point where the country is effectively required to reduce its emissions from
one period to the next. Technically,  this rule is as follows:
If GDP(c,t-l) < GDP, then no quota  (4)
If GDP(c,t-l) >  GDP, then Quota(c,t) = Quota(c,t-l)  * [  - a (GDP(c,t-1)  - GDP )P]
(Quota(c,t-l) is replaced  by Emissions(c,t-1)for  Parties  entering)  (5)
Negotiable  parameters  include  the  per capita GDP  ceiling  below  which  countries  are  exempted
(parameter GDP"), the initial  allowed emission growth rate  (y), and the short term (a) and long tein (0)
reduction rates. Observable parameters include per capita GDP at previous period and, for Parties taking
comrnitment for the first time,  GHG Emissions at previous period.  We assume that Parties within Kyoto
would enter with their Kyoto targets.
2.5.  Multlcriterla (Norwegian  proposal)
Some  Parties  have  proposed  to base  emission  quotas  on  a wider range  of parameters  consisting of
ability to pay (captured  by per capita GDP), opportunity  to abate  (represented  by carbon  intensity  of
GDP) and per capita emissions (submissions  by Norway,  1996,  Australia,  1997,  Iceland,  1997  to  the
AGBM7). Since these proposals  did not fully  specify the weights of each of these parameters,  they areLecocq, Crassous / International  Climate regime beyond 2012  7
better  described  as  families  of rules.  We  focus  here  on  the  Norwegian  proposal,  which  has  been
extensively  analyzed  in  the  literature  on post-Kyoto  allocations  (Reiner  and Jacoby,  1997,  Ringius  et
al., 1998).
In  this proposal,  quotas  are  allocated  based on the  following  recursive  formula (6),  where  the ratio
between each parameter  and the average  for all  regions with quotas is used as indicator,  and where a, b
and c are positive weights.  Under these specifications,  one rnay expect  to see the rate at  which quotas
decrease  rise  abruptly when  developing  regions join in  and  make  the  averages  drop.  From that  point
onward indeed, the reference  on the basis of which the emission quota varies  is lower. However,  we will
see in the simulations that this effect has very limited impact.
Quota (c,t) = Quota (c,t-1)  I  GDP(c,t-l )/POP(c ,t-1)  Emissions(c,t-1 )/GDP(c,t-l)
,  L  -aAverage  GDP/POP(t-)  b Average Emissions/GDP(t-l)
Emissions(c,t-l)POP(c,t-l) 1
c Average Emissions/POP(t-l)J  (6)
Negotiable  parameters  are  the  weights  a,  b  and  c  of  each  parameter.  Observables  include  GDP,
population and emissions  at previous periods. For Parties currently  within Annex B, we can assume that
initial  quota  would be  their  Kyoto  quota.  For  developing  countries,  the  initial  quota  would  be  their
emissions at time of entry into force (or last measured emnissions).  As in the flatrate  and Jacoby case, we
introduce aper  capita  emission ceiling to govern developing countries'  entry in the system.
2.6.  Historical responsihilUites (]3rszin proposal)
The Government of Brazil has proposed to index quota allocation on the relative responsibility  of each
countries in current  temperature  increase  has been  widely studied  and reviewed  (UNFCCC,  1997,  Den
Elzen et al., 1999). In this scheme, as in the Contraction and Convergence approach,  a global target is set.
This global quota is then shared depending on each Party's contribution to current temperature  increase,
which is computed based on historical  GHG emissions time  series, and on a climate  model linking GHG
emissions  and  mean  surface  temperature  increase.  As  such,  proponents  of this  scheme  argue,  it  is
consistent with the polluter-pay principle. The original proposal also includes a Clean Development  Fund
that would collect fines  imposed on Parties  with  excess  emissions,  and would fund emission  reduction
projects  in  the  developing  world.  But  the  same  methodology  can  be  extended  to  the  whole  world,
developing countries included (Den Elzen et aL,  1999).
In the Brazilian  proposal, prime policy parameters  are a world emission target,  a model representing
the impact of GHG emissions on mean surface temperature,  and an initial year for counting historic GHG
emissions. As underscored  by Den  Elzen et aL,  the agreement  on these policy parameters might not be
easy to obtain: the nature of the greenhouse  gases included in the analysis,  as well as the whether or not
CO2 emissions from sinks are included have  strong impact on the final result. Moreover,  there are several
competing models to represent the atmospheric carbon cycle  and temperature response (McAvaney et al.,
2001).
Negotiable parmneters include present and historic GHG emissions. Although emission time series are
only  reconstructions  based  on  other  indicators  (fuel  consumption,  economic  growth,  etc.),  and  thus
largely uncertain,  Den Elzen et al. suggest that uncertainties on pre-1950 data does not matter too much
for the final  sharing, because of the low level of these emissions, and the progressive "decay" of GHG in8  Lecocq and Crassous  /International Climate  Regime beyond 2012
the atmosphere.  Den Elzen have also suggested to  include a threshold above which developing countries
would take on conmmitments.
2.7.  Bottom-up Approaches
All the proposals we have discussed so far proceed from a top-down  logic: quotas are computed based
on global indicators such as national population, GDP or national emissions. However, this approach only
captures  cross-country  variations  in the  structure  of the  economies  to the  extent  they  are reflected  in
aggregate indicators. This is why bottom-up approaches  have been proposed.
In the  Triptych proposal  (Phylipsen  et aL,  1998  for Annex  B only,  extended to the whole world by
Groenenberg  et al., 2000),  the economy  of each  country  is  divided  into  three sectors:  heavy  industry,
power  generation  and  domestic.  Abatement  targets  for the former  two derive  from assumptions  about
growth, technical change and technical  substitution. Quotas for the third sector are based on a per  capita
emission  allocation.  The  Triptych  approach was used  in particular to guide  the intra-EU  sharing of the
Union's global -8% target under the Kyoto Protocol.
The  Multi-Sector  Convergence  Proposal  (Jansen  et  al.,  2001)  distinguishes  7  sectors:  power
production,  households,  transportation,  industry,  services,  agriculture  and  waste.  For  each  of  these
sectors,  assumptions  about growth and technical change  are made,  on the basis of which sectoral  quotas
are  computed.  The  authors  also  propose  to  grant  supplemental  emission  allowances  indexed  on
parameters  such  as climate,  population  density,  agriculture  type,  and the  transitional situation  of some
economies or renewable energy potentials.
In  both  proposals,  the  set  of  observable  parameters  is  rather  large.  GHG  emissions  must  be
disaggregated  in a rather thin way.  Similarly,  basic economic indicators (growth  rate, output level, etc.)
must be known for each of the considered  sectors. Negotiable  paramneters include growth assumptions for
each  sector, as  well as benchmarks  for estimating abatement  potential.  Although the Triptych approach
was  used in  practice  within the  EU, it  is not clear whether  this  experiment  could  be replicated  with a
larger, and more heterogeneous  set of countries, given the important data requirement of this scheme
3.  Assessing distributive impacts of allocation rules with international  allowance trading
To assess the distributive  impacts of each of these quota allocation rules  for all Parties,  we develop a
partial equilibrium model of the allowance market.
3.1.  The model
Let the world be divided into regions indexed  by r. For each 5-year commitment  period from the first
(2008-2012)  to the ninth (2048-2052),  indexed  by t, the  quota allocation  rule defines a subset R(t) of
regions  with commitments,  and  a set of quotas Q(r,t) for all  regions  r in R(t).  As discussed  above,  the
formula for quota derivation depends on the allocation rule being considered, with generic function:
Q(r,t) = f(Q(r,t-l), Observables(t-1),  ..., Observables(l),  Observables(before 2008))  (7)
We assume  a perfect  market  for emission  allowances  to which participate all  regions within  R(t). All
regions  out of R(t)  are  excluded  from  the  market.  During  period  t,  each  region  can  thus purchase  a
quantity Ep(r,t) on that market (Ep is negative  is the region is net seller).  As a result, and assuming bothLecocq,  Crassous  /International  Climate regime beyond 2012  9
full compliance  and no banking or borrowing across periods, the constraint each  region faces is given by
(8) below, where E(r,t) is the net GHG emissions of that region during commitment period t:
E(r,t) 5 Q(r,t) + Ep(r,t)  (8)
Let  a(r,t)  be  the  domestic  abatement  level,  expressed  in  percentage  of business-as-usual  GHG
emissions Eb(r,t). By definition:
E(r,t) = [ -a(r,t)]  Eb(r,t)  (9)
We assume that the marginal costs of GHG emissions abatement  Ct in region r at period t depend only
on the relative  abatement  level  a(r,t). We  also  assume  that each region is price-taker  on the  allowance
market. Let p(t) be the equilibrium price on that market at period t. Each region thus minimizes its budget
constraint under program:
a(r,t)
Min a(r#t) f  C.(a)da + p(t) Ep(r,t)  (10)
0
And individual compliance constraint:
[l-a(r,t)] Eb(r,t) 5 Q(r,t) + Ep(r,t)  (11)
The set of optimal regional abatement aW(r,t)  solution to problem (I0-11) is given by the equalization of
individual marginal abatement  costs, which also yields the equilibrium market price of allowances:
C,(a*(i,t)) = Cq(a  (j,t)) = p(t)  (12)
3.2.  Discussion of key Essumptions behind this model
The above framework incorporates four important assumptions that are worth explaining
The allowance market is strictly limited to regions with emission quota. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the
Clean Development  Mechanism  (CDM)  allows  Annex B Pardes  to finance  emission reduction  projects
out of Annex B and  claim the resulting emission  reductions against  their targets.  In practice  however,
long project preparation  time and the necessity to strictly verify that the proposed projects indeed reduce
GHG emissions  compared to what would have  happened  otherwise  suggest that the potential supply  of
credits from the CDM might  remain small  compared to obligations of Annex  B Parties,  at least for the
first commitment period  (Josko and  Michaelowa,  2002).  In the current  paper,  we  do not  consider  the
CDM or CDM-like mechanisms.
A perfect allowance trading  market. We assume that all  Parties are price-takers  and do not model the
possibility that few Parties might use their (supply or demand) market power to their advantage. This is a
rather  restrictive  assumption  as  long  as  most  of the  supply  of allowances  is  controlled  by a  limited
number of Parties such as Russia  and Ukraine  in  the first  commitment  period  (Ellerman  et al.,  1998).
Second, Parties are assumed totally free to trade their allowances.  Again this is an approximation, because
of the  so-called  supplementarity  condition  of the  Kyoto  Protocol,  which  states  that  trading  shall  be
"supplemental to" domestic policies and measures. But no quantified cap and trade is introduced8.
8 The Marrakesh Accords state that any point of time no Party shall hold less than 70fo of its baseline emissions in its
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Full compliance at each period of time,  no borrowing or banking. The  political  economy of non-
compliance is beyond the scope of the present paper. In this analysis,  we simply aim at showing what are
the consequences  of full compliance,  and at identifying  when and where tensions,  if any, occur. In fact,
even assuming full compliance,  the Kyoto Protocol provides for banking of emission allowances  between
periods (borrowing is fornally forbidden, although the compliance regime is akin to°). We do not capture
this mechanism and will come back to it when we discuss the evolution of prices in section 7.
Parties  do not inflate their emissions before joining Rules  which  base first quota  on past baseline
emissions  (most particularly  Jacoby,  Multicriteria  and  Flatrate) create  perverse  incentives  for countries
either to inflate their emission statistics or to postpone environmentally friendly investments, policies and
measures.  This  risk  is  in  fact  constitutive  of  all  schemes  where  quotas  are  somehow  based  on  an
environmentil  indicator (emissions,  carbon content  of GDP,  share of renewables  in power  production,
etc.).  The  measurement  issue can probably  be  solved or  contained.  The  magnitude  of the  incentive to
delay climate friendly policies, on the other hand, is unclear.  We know that so far major policies affecting
GHG  emissions  have  been taken  "in passing"  (Hourcade  et al.,  1996)  for reasons  totally unrelated  to
environment.  But we also know that this was largely  due to ignorance  of the climate externality. Attitudes
might change if a clear financial  reward, in the form of potential carbon sales, is attached to the decisions
leading to highest  emissions.  For the present exercise,  we simply assume that the Parties do not behave
strategically vis-a-vis future quotas. We will come back to this point in conclusion.
4.  Calibration and representation of uncertainty
4.1.  Business-as-usual scenarios
We divide the world into  12 regions (Table 2). In a database of long-term scenarios  assembled  by the
Intergovernmental  Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Morita and Lee,  1998), we selected all the scenarios
which (a) provided projections  for population,  GDP and CO2 ernissions'°, (b)  at least up to 2050 and (c)
with worldwide scope but disaggregated in at least 5 regions.
9  In fact, the compliance provisions of the Kyoto Protocol - to be ratified separately by Parties - state that Parties  with
emissions  in excess of their allowances at the end of the first commitment period will have to redeem that excess volume
plus a 30 0/o  penalty during the next commitnent  period. Borrowing is thus taxed and not strictly forbidden (Hourcade and
Ghersi, 2002). But it would make sense for a Party to use that provision only if it assumed during the next period the price
of carbon  would be much lower,  or that its domestic abatement  costs would suddenly decrease.  Such configurations,  we
will see, can occur.
'°From this point  onward,  we restrict our analysis  to fossil-fuel CO 2 emissions  because there  is limited regionalized
information on business-as-usual emissions and on abatement costs for both non-fossil-fuel CO 2 emissions (deforestation)
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Annex B  Non annex B
Region  Description  Region  Description
USA  USA  CPA  Centrally  Planned  Asia  (incl.
China)
CANZ  Canada,  Australia  and  New  SAS  South Asia (incl. India)
Zealand
WEU  Western  Europe  ROA  Rest of Asia
EEU  Eastern  Europe  MENA  Middle East and North Africa
FSU  Former Soviet Union  SAFR  Sub-Saharan Africa
JPN  Japan  LAM  Latin and Central  America
Table 2: World Regions in our model.
Out of the 416  scenarios in the database,  19 meet these criteria:  the 6 IPCC lS92 scenarios (Leggett et
al.,  1992),  the  7 EPA  scenarios  (Morita  and  Lee,  1998)  and  the  6  IIASA-WEC  1995  scenarios
(Nakicenovi6  et al.,  1998).  We  also  include  the IPCC  1998  scenarios  (Naki6enovi6  and  Swart,  2000),
which constitute the most comprehensive and most recent scenarisation exercise undertaken by the IPCC.
Annex I describes  how the data has been disaggregated  or reaggregated  to fit into the  12 selected world
regions, and how 1990 and 2000 data have been harmonized.
These scenarios,  with the exception of the IS92 family,  are "computerized  storytelling":  they translate
numerically a set of predefined assumptions  (storylines)  using computable general  equilibrium models to
achieve  some  degree of intemal  consistency.  The IS92  scenarios juxtapose assumptions  on population,
economic and emissions growth (Pepper et al., 1998). We include them because they serve as reference in
a large number of  publications.
The 6 IS92  scenarios  are articulated around  median IS92a (0.97%  average  annual  population  growth
rate between 2000 and 2050, 2.52% economic  growth rate and  1.21% emissions growth rate). IS92b to f
are variants.  IS92b assumes slightly lower emissions due to increased environmental  awareness. IS92c  is
characterized  by low  population and  low  economic growth  rate.  IS92d  is a variant  of 92c  with higher
economic  growth rate.  IS92e represents  another extreme  with high economic  growth  and high emission
growth. Last, IS92f explores very high population growth.
The IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES,  lNaki6enovi6 and Swart,  2000) describe  four
families  of scenarios  characterized  by  high/low  openness  of  the  regional  econonies  and  high/low
awareness of (non-climate) environmental  issues. We use the representation of these scenarios  computed
with the IMAGE model (Alcamo et al., 1998). Family Al (high openness,  low awareness of environment)
is characterized  by  a rapid stabilization of World population  (2050), very high growth  (+3.81% annual
average)  and  high  technical  change.  Three  variants  represent  three  possible  technology  directions:
intensive fossil-fuel (Alf), rapid penetration of non-renewable  energies (Alt) and median (Alb). BI (high
openness, high awareness of environment)  is characterized by slightly slower growth (+3.21%), but lower
emissions overall due to rapid diffusion of non-carbon technologies.
A2 (low openness,  low awareness  of environment) represents the polar case: a regionalized  world with
lower growth  and high population.  Coal  is  dominant in  many regions  because of low extraction costs.
Technical  change  and energy efficiency are  limited. Last, family  B2 (low openness,  high awareness  of
environment)  represents  sustainable  development in a regionalized  world.  Emissions are  lowest overall,
but population is higher than in Al and A2, and economic growth lower.12  Lecocq and Crassous / International  Climate Regime beyond 2012
The 7 EPA1998  scenarios were built during the preparation  of the SRES. Around median EPA1, they
explore  higher/lower  openness  of  the  economy,  and  thus  higher/lower  economic  growth  rate  and
higher/lower assumptions  about technical  change.  EPA2  is high/high,  EPA3  high/low,  EPA4  low/high
and  EPA5  low/low.  EPA6  and  7  are  variations  around  EPAI  assuming  higher  (respectively  lower)
economic growth and technical change in the OECD.
The IIASA-WEC scenarios  all assume the same population baseline  (1%  average annual  growth rate).
They differ by the economic growth  rate,  and by  the structure of prinary energy supply.  Scenarios  Al,
A2 and A3 all assume fairly high economic growth rate (+2.6%) and high energy efficiency gains (0.9%
annually). Al  relies mostly on coal on gas, assumed abundant, A2 represents a coal based future and A3,
on the other hand, assumes high reliance  on nuclear and on renewables,  with progressive phasing out of
fossil-fuels.  B is somehow a median scenario with lower economic growth, and balanced development of
renewables vis-a-vis fossils. Last, Cl  and C2 assume rapid phase out of fossil fuel. They yield the lowest
emission levels overall, and differ only by the extent to which nuclear is used.
population  Per Capital  Carbon
Scenario  0va20ation  DP variation  intensity of
Soenario  20002050  GDPvanaboGDP  variation
(%/)  (%/)  (%
EPAI  0.91  1.4  -1.1
EPA2  0.74  2.3  -1.5
EPA3  0.91  1.47  -0.75
EPA4  0.91  1.47  -1.30
EPA5  1.13  0.7  -0.7
EPA6  0.91  1.9  -1.4
EPA7  0.91  1.0  -0.7
Alb  0.71  3.1  -2.0
Alf  0.71  3.1  -1.7
Alt  0.71  3.1  -2.4
A2  1.21  1.0  -0.8
Bi  0.71  2.5  -2.5
B2  0.86  1.9  -1.9
IS92a  0.97  1.55  -1.31
IS92b  0.97  1.55  -1.41
IS92c  0.51  0.9  -1.5
IS92d  0.51  1.8  -1.9
IS92e  0.97  2.2  -1.4
IS92f  1.34  1.3  -1.2
IAI  1.00  1.6  -1.7
IA2  1.00  1.6  -1.2
IA3  1.00  1.6  -2.0
IB  1.00  1.1  -1.3
ICI  1.00  1.1  -2.5
IC2  1.00  1.1  -2.5
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We  use  the  so-called  Kaya  decomposition  to  explore  the  relative  impact  of population  growth,
economic growth  and carbon content of the economy  on overall emissions growth"  (Table  3).  First, we
see that a majority of  the scenarios have population growth assumptions in the range of 0.9% to  1.0%.
Economic growth and carbon content of the economy,  on the other hand, are more dispersed,  as shown
on Figure  2 below.  We can distinguish four main groups: high growth, high decarbonization  scenarios on
the lower right side (Alb,f and t and BI), low growth, high decarbonization  scenarios  on the lower left
(ICI  and IC2),  low  growth,  low decarbonization  scenarios  on the upper right (EPA5,7  and  A2)  and a
central  cluster  which  explores  - at  similar population  growth  rate  (except  for  EPA2,  IS92c,  d and  f)
variations around a "central point" of +1.5% growth rate and -1.5% decarbonization.
Per capita GDP Variations (%)
0,0%
0,  %  0,5%  1,0%  1,5%  2,0%  2,5%  3,0%  3,5%
-0,5%
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Figure 2: Evolution of World Gross Product and carbon intensity of value added 2000-2050 (annual
average)for  selected  scenarios
The  same  figure  drawn  for  developing  countries  only  would  show  higher  economic  growth  rate
assumptions  (up  to +6.1%  in the Al  scenarios).  It would also show a clearer linear relation between the
variations of per capita GDP and the variations of carbon intensity of GDP. The fact that this relation be
better  respected  in  developing countries  can  be  discussed, but  this is beyond  the  scope  of the present
paper.
" Variations in  carbon intensity of GDP result from changes in  the structure of the economy, i.e. in  the primary energy
content of each  dollar of value  added, and of modifications in  the structure of the energy system, i.e. the carbon intensity
of  energy.14  Lecocq and Crassous  / International  Climate Regime beyond 2012
Let  us  last  note  that  according  to  a  comprehensive  review  of  long-term  economic  and  emission
scenarios undertaken by the IPCC, the set we have selected gives a good representation of the range of all
the plausible  images of the  World at 2050  that have been  proposed  in the  literature  (Nakicenovic  and
Swart,  2000).  This  is  illustrated  on  Figure 3 below  shows  the world  population,  GDP  and  emissions
trajectories  in the  25 scenarios retained  in this study, compared with the range of all the scenarios  in the
SRES  database  in  2050  (red  bar).  The  only  exception  is  for  emissions,  where  a few  projections  are
IS98Alf.
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Figure 3: Evolution of world population, gross product and  fossil fuel CO2 emissions 2000-2050 in
selected scenarios.
4.2.  Marginal abatement costs
For the first commitment period,  we use a set of regional  marginal  abatement costs  curves (MACCs)
produced by Ellerman et aL (1998). We simply rescale the original functions to make them depend on the
percentage  of abatement  (as opposed to  volume of abatement),  and adapt them at the margin to  fit ourLecocq, Crassous  /International  Climate regime beyond 2012  15
geographical  coverage  (see Annex 1 for details).  These MACCs are quadratic,  with regional coefficients
are provided in Table 4 below.
C,(a) = o- ' + ,a  (13)
These  MACCs  were  computed with  EPPA, a computable  general equilibrium  model of the World's
economy (Ellerman et al., 1998). They thus provide  for each region an aggregated  representation of the
macroeconomic  costs  of imposing  a  given constraint  on  CO2 emissions,  during the  first commitment
period. On top of direct technical costs of reducing GHG emissions,  they also capture cross-sectoral  and
cross-country  spillovers (e.g. through  modifications  in the prices of energy, modifications of the balance
between  carbon  intensive  and  non-carbon  intensive  goods,  or  impacts  of carbon  flows  on  the  trade
balance.
Region  a  1
USA  1689.11  73.53
CANZ  2786.52  769.99
JPN  2717.01  159.61
WEU  1893.65  -46.72
EEU  1232.59  19.36
FSU  1338.98  3.06
CPA  224.79  43.01
SAS  354.29  38.40
ROA  445.86  116.12
MENA  2749.84  280.89
LAM  594.35  43.09
AFR  594.35  43.09
Table 4: Regional  marginal  abatement  cost curve  finctions coefficients.
According to a review of economic analysis of the Kyoto Protocol  conducted  by Weyant (1999), the
EPPA MACCs are in the middle of the range of 10 models tested for the USA and Europe. For Japan, the
model  produces  higher than  average  costs  (although  by far  not  the  highest),  and  for  CANZ,  EPPA
estimates are on the lower side at low emission reduction levels, and on the higher side for high emission
reduction  levels  (pp.xxiii-xl).  For  developing  countries,  fewer  comparison  points  are  available,  but
comparisons  with results from the Second Generation  Model (Fischer  Vanden et al.,  1993)  suggest that
EPPA MACCs are similar.
EPPA MACCs are a priori linked to the business-as-usual  scenario, which is integrated  in the EPPA
model. To use them with all  the baseline scenarios  we have selected,  we make the assumption that from
one scenario to the other, the distribution  of abatement  opportunities by cost is roughly similar, but that
the  volumes  of each  class  of abatement  varies  depending  on the  size  of overall  emissions  (which  is
captured by writing the MACC as a fimction of percentage of abatement instead of  pure volume). We will
come back to this widely made assumption in the next phase of our research.
Beyond 2012, and in the absence of an in-house  top down or bottom up model on which to base costs
estimates, we simply "extend"  the MACCs to the nine commitment  periods. To do so, we start from the
classification  of abatement  opportunities proposed  by Jaccard  et aL  (1997).  They distinguish three main
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*  Energy  demand management  (e.g.  through taxes,  fiscal incentives,  information campaigns,  etc.),
and changes  in  end-use  equipment  (e.g.  energy  efficiency  of appliances):  decisions  are  typically
made by private decision-makers (households,  or decentralized levels in companies). The turnover of
capital stock ranges from a few years to two decades.
*  Modifications  of infrastructure  equipment  and  industrial  processes:  this  encompasses  buildings
efficiency,  major  transit modes, and  industrial and  power-producing  infrastructure,  the turnover of
which is measured in decades.  Centralized public and/or private decision-makers  largely govern this
level.  Every decision involves an amount of capital  whose order of magnitude  is far higher than in
previous level.
*  Land-use  and urban  planning:  this level is driven both by infrastructure  decisions  and by specific
public  policies.  These  policies  can  either  be  explicit,  i.e.  aimed  at  shaping  urban  forms  or  the
distribution  of the  human  settlements,  or  implicit,  i.e.  influencing  land  use  and  urban  patterns
through subsidies to mobility, or rules governing tenants and landlords relationships.
We first make the assumption that each period brings new abatement opportunities of the first category
("short term"),  in a volume essentially  independent  from previous period abatement  decisions.  Indeed, if
we  discard  induced  effects  of  incentives  on  preferences  and  behavior,  demand-side  management  is
essentially  reversible:  if payments  are not renewed  from one period  to the next, final  consumers  revert
back to previous consumption  patterns.  Similarly  end-use  equipment  are on average  replaced  from one
period to the next, hence providing - leaving aside the effect of previous period abatement  on technology
and consumer preferences - a whole new set of abatement opportunities.
Since we reason  at a very aggregated  level, both geographically and over time, and at the margin of a
baseline  scenario,  where  a given  level of goods  and services  is assumed  to be delivered  regardless  of
abatement  decisions,  we  can consider  that the set of abatement  opportunities from the  second category
("long  term")  at  each  point  of time  is  independent  from  previous abatement  decisions  (Arrow,  1999).
However,  this assumption  is valid only if abatement  levels  remain low enough not to trigger premature
replacement  of existing capital stock: otherwise,  the set of abatement opportunities  at next period would
be altered (see Lecocq et al., 1998 for an explicit representation of capital stock vintages).  We will come
back to this point when we discuss the abatement trajectories we obtain.
The question is now to determine the volume and prices of this new set of abatement opportunities.  We
will make here the assumption that the relative distribution of low-cost, high cost abatement opportunities
remains unchanged from one period to the next. This is a disputable assumption,  which does not capture
the fact that the contribution of each sector to emissions might vary from one period to the next, and thus
change the relative distribution of cheap and expensive abatement opportunities.
Because  of  technical  change,  lower  costs  for  clean  technologies  should  result  in  a  downward
translation  of the  MACC.  But  as  clean  technologies  penetrate  the  market,  some  previously  available
abatement  opportunities  disappear  as they are now integrated  in the business-as-usual  scenario,  and the
MACC is translated leftwards.  The net effect  on the MACC  is not clear.
An  additional  complication  comes  from  induced  technical  change,  which  covers  cumulative  effects
such as learning-by-doing,  network externalities, etc.  This is potentially a very important factor for long-
term climate policies, but the way these effects should be represented and the calibration of the models is
still very controversial  (Hourcade and Shukla, 2001,  p.550). Consequently,  we choose here not to try and
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On  this  basis,  and  assuming  that  the  two  effects  of autonomous  technical  change  cancel  out,  we
"extend"  our MACCs to future  periods by assuming they remain  identical  over time.  We thus use the
coefficients  of Table  4  for  all  commitment  periods.  This  is  consistent  with findings  from  Le  Pesant
(1997),  who  estimated  MACCs  for  future  commitment  periods  based  on  simulation  results  from  the
Second Generation Model (Fisher-Vanden  et al., 1993) and found that the same curve could approximate
with good confidence  the model's response to a constraint  on emissions at various periods. We will come
back on MACCs for future period in a subsequent research.
S.  Parametrization of quota aliocation rules
Before estimating  the economic  consequences  of the adoption of quota  allocation rules,  we have  to
calibrate the different rules. For the time being, we focus only on the first five rules described in section 2,
namely Flatrate, immediate per capita  allocation, Contraction and Convergence, Jacoby and Multicriteria.
We  will  introduce  the  Brazilian  proposal  and  possibly  bottom-up  approaches,  depending  on  data
availability,  in the next step of this research.
For all  the rules we test, we assume that the Kyoto  Protocol enters  into force without the US for the
first commitment  period. The  selected rule  applies for the second and all  subsequent  periods. The rules
are as described in section 2, and we make three additional assumptions:
o  For Contraction and Convergence and Per Capita,  all regions, developed and developing alike, take
commitments as soon as in 2013.
o  For the other three rules, a per capita GDP threshold govems the entry of Parties. That feature was
an integral part of the Jacoby rule, and we also apply it to Flatrate and  Multicriteria. This threshold
applies to all regions, meaning that if Parties currently within Annex B have a per capita  GDP lower
than the threshold in 2012, they go out in the second commitment period.
O  Flatrate, Jacoby and Multicriteria,  providing only quota reduction rates, require some reference to
define  the first quota. For Parties joining in 2013  and having participated  in Kyoto  at the previous
period,  we  select their Kyoto  quota as reference.  For regions not participating  in  Kyoto  during  the
first  commitment  period  (such  as  USA)  or joining  later,  the  reference  is  the  business-as-usual
emission level of the region in the previous period, which thus depends on the scenario.
To compare  the distributive  impacts  of these five  rules,  we calibrate  them  so that they  result in the
same  total  cumulated  ermissions  over period  2008-2052  under the  median  IIASA-WEC  Al  scenario.
Although the time distribution of emissions matters, cumulative emissions are a good first-order proxy for
the impact of each rule on climate change. We use a reference 350 GtC budget,  which corresponds  to the
road  towards  stabilization  of atmnospheric  CO2 concentrations  at  550  ppm  in  2100  under  a  median
scenario in between the WGE and WGI paths' 2.
We will see in the next section that expost cumulative emissions may differ from that target depending
on the  scenario  effectively  realized.  By choosing  a median  scenario,  we allow for overshooting.  Some
constituents may argue that the worst scenario should be used to make sure the emission target is reached.
12 WRE and  WGI  are  two sets of world  emission trajectories  leading  to the same  atmospheric  CO 2 concentration  in
2100.  WRE  is characterized  by higher  emission  levels  at  first,  but by a  sharpest decse afterwards (Houghton  et aL,
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This  debate,  which  ultimately  boils  down  to  Parties'  beliefs  about  the  damages  of climate  change
(Ambrosi et al., 2002), is beyond the scope of the present  paper. Our choice  here  is not normative,  but
simply reflects what we think Parties might realistically agree on.
Table 5 below summarizes  the parameters  we selected for each rule. We detail below how these figures
were obtained.
Rule  Parameter  Value
Flatrate  Quota  reduction  rate  from  one
period to next  -I %
Per  capita  GDP threshold  USS3000
Per capita allocation  Per Capita  emnission quota  900 kgC/yr
Contraction & Convergence  World Emissions Envelope  Mid
Convergence year  2030
a  4








Table 5: Parametrization  of each rule to reach either cumulative emissions of 350 GtC over period
2008-2052 under the IIASA-WEC A1 scenario.
For Flatrate,  there is a trade-off between the rate at which the quotas diminish and the value of the per
capita GDP threshold. The higher the threshold, the tighter carbon constraint has to be on OECD Parties.
For example,  a threshold of $10,000  (no developing  region enters  before 2050) would require a -7.5%
decrease of Annex B quotas  from one period to the next, a $4,000 quota would still require -2.5%, while
$1,000  would allow quota to rise by 2% from one period to next. We choose here a $3,000 value,  which
requires slightly decreasing quota (-_%)13.
We use the  samne threshold in the Jacoby  scheme, but in that case there  is still some flexibility as  one
can play between the initial emission growth countries are  entitled to when they cross the GDP threshold
(parameter  y), and the speed with which this initial  rate decreases  as per capita  GDP increases.  We use
here the set of parameters  suggested in  Jacoby et al. (1999).  Under these assumptions,  Parties can still
increase their emissions by 1%  per period when they join.  The turnout point occurs  when they are 30%
richer, i.e. at $4,000/cap GDP. From this point onward,  their quota must diminish from one period to the
next, at a rate which reaches  1% for a per capita GDP of $13,000.
In the Multicriteria proposal, we choose to attribute equal weights to the three (normalized) parameters.
Simulations  with  a 0.5  weight  attached  to  one of the parameter,  and 0.25  to the other  two  led to no
significant deviations in terms of quota allocation along the reference  scenario. We scale these parameters
13  Although  it may  look small,  this value  actually  requires  a rather  strong effort  given  the  fact  that  during the first
commitment periods, world emissions in the baseline rise by 6 to7% from period to the next in the IAI  scenarios. In other
words, the total effort is actually -7 to 8% (worldwide, regional levels may vary).Lecocq, Crassous /International  Climate regime beyond 2012  19
at 0.001.  In other words, for the  average  country within  the  group with  quotas,  the rate  at  which quota
must decrease from one period to the next is 0.3% This is a rather low figure, but it is sufficient given that
there are large emitters way above the average.
For the per capita allocation,  the individual  emission quota derives immediately  from the cumulative
emissions  target. We find a per capita quota of 0.9tC/hab/year.  This is lower than current world average
(1.06).  China,  India and most  low-income  countries  are below.  Most middle-income  countries,  and oil
exporters,  are above.
Last,  for contraction  and convergence,  the global volume of emissions and burden sharing are entirely
disjoint, and we are  free to use  any sharing  parameter.  We conservatively  select the values made  in the
original  proposal  by the Global Commons  Institute,  i.e.  a convergence  date of 2030  and a convergence
speed  parameter  a  = 4.  Figure  4  and  5 below  show  that the  sensitivity  of quota  allocation  to  these
parameters is high.
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Figures  4 and  5: Influence ofparameters  a and convergence date on quota allocation.
6.  Effective emissions:  how baselines matter
We are now armed to analyze the economic consequences  of adopting various quota allocation rules in
2013 under the different  baseline scenarios described in 4.1, using the model developed in section 3. The
model is programmed under GAMS.  The code of the program is available from the authors upon request.
The next three sections aim at discussing our results.20  Lecocq and  Crassous  / International  Climate Regime beyond 2012
In  this  section,  we  analyze  how  each  of the  selected  rules  effectively  performs  in  terms  of total
cumulated emissions, taken as a proxy for environmental  performance.  Despite the fact that they have all
been calibrated  on a 350 GtC target for the medium  scenario IIASA-Al,  figure  6 demonstrates  that total
ernissions  over the  nine comrmitment  periods  vary significantly  depending on  the baseline  scenario. The
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Figure  6.  Cumulative emissions (2008-2052)for each quota allocation  rules
6.1.  Contraction and Convergence  and Per Capita
Contraction  and convergence  is the only rule, which effectively caps  emissions  at the agreed target'4.
Downward  deviations  occur  only  if,  at  some  point  in  time,  baseline  emissions  are  lower  than  the
predefined  envelope.  However,  it is not because aggregate baseline ernissions are below the envelope that
regional  baseline emissions  are below the  quota allocated under the contraction  and convergence  rule.  In
fact,  even in the lowest point of the contraction  and convergence  column (scenario  IC2), OECD regions
still experience  substantial deficit of allowances.
Under the per capita rule, the key driver of cumulative  emissions is population  growth.  Scenarios  with
higher population growth rate overshoot the target (e.g. IS92f),  while scenarios with lower population rate
14 We  have nornalized  cumulative  emissions  so  that differences  in US  and  non-Annex  B emissions  during  the first
commitment period (2008-2012) do not appear.  Indeed, since the rule applies only to 2013 onward, these  variations are not
a consequence  of the adoption of the selected rule. In  any case, the volumes  are very low (below I  OGtC).Lecocq, Crassous  /International Climate regime beyond 2012  21
result  in  better  environmental  performance.  In  the  latter case,  and contrary  to  the preceding  rule,  the
global emission constraint is more stringent.  The price of carbon may not be higher though since baseline
emissions  may  still  be below  the  computed  world  quota,  for  example  in  the  case of the  lower  three
scenarios (IC 1,  IC2 and IS92c).
If we exclude  these three scenarios,  the  range of cumulative  emissions  is still large:  from 298  to 384
GtC, that is a 25% variation around the 350 GtC target. This result, however, is strongly dependent on the
two  extreme  population  growth  assumptions  (+0.51%  in  IS92d  and  +1.34%  in  IS92f).  Leaving  them
aside, the range is narrowed  to 320-367 GtC, or 13% around target. This is a reasonable  figure compared
to the uncertainties  surrounding the measurement of non fossil fuel CO2 and non-CO2 emissions.
6.2.  Flatrate, Jacoby and Multicriteria
In  the flatrate  rule, two  effects impact on total  cumulated emissions. First,  because  of the $3,000 per
capita GDP  threshold,  the  time at  which regions  take  their  first commitment  depends  on  the baseline
scenario.  Figure  7 below shows how. If all OECD countries join in 2013,  Former  Soviet Union actually
go out of the coordination  and do not  come back until at least 2018.  Within  developing countries,  Latin
America and Middle East (MENA) enter rapidly,  while the three  Asia regions (CAP, SAS  and ROA) do
not  enter  before  2018  at  best.  Sub-Saharan  Africa  remains  out  of the  coordination  in  most  of the
scenarios.
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Figure 7:  Range of dates at which regions take on first commitments (flatrate rule, threshold $3,000
per capita).
Second, since we assume that the first quota for Parties joining the coordination is based on its previous
period business as usual  emissions, baseline scenario has a very  strong influence on the initial quota and
on  the  total  cumulative  quota  (since  the rate  of variation  from  one  period  to  the  next  is  fixed).  The
example  of the  USA is  striking.  This region  enters  in  2013  in all  scenarios,  but with an  initial quota
ranging from  1.25  to  1.94  GtC/year depending  on baseline  emissions in 2008-2012.  The total emissions
the  region  is  allowed  to  during  period  2013-1052  vary  accordingly  from  10.8  to  16.7  GtC.  WEU
represents the polar case where the initial quota is fixed regardless  of the baseline scenario because of the
Kyoto reference  (Figure 8).22  Lecocq and  Crassous /International Climate  Regime beyond 2012
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Figures  8: Quota allocation  for USA and WEU regions under Flatrate  Rule.
Overall, total  emissions under the flatrate rule range from 304 to 399 GtC, a 24% range around the 350
GtC target (again excluding IC I, IC2 and IS92c). But this time, the results are more evenly spread  and do
not depend only on a few extreme scenarios, as illustrated by a much higher standard deviation than in the
per capita case (35 against 28).
The same two effects  are at play in the Jacoby and Multicriteria rules.  But there, contrary to the flatrate
case,  the evolution of the quota between periods also depends  on observable  paramneters: per capita GDP
(Jacoby)  and per capita  GDP, per capita  emissions  and carbon intensity of value added (Multicriteria).  In
both rules, the  higher these parameters,  the faster  the quota diminishes.  Our numeric  analysis, however,
shows that these variations are negligible compared to the initial difference  in quotas.  For examnple,  in the
USA case, which  is the most extreme because all three parameters  are high,  cumulative  quota from 2013
to 2052 range from  10.8 to  16.7 with the Flatrate  rule, against  10.4  to  15.9 with Jacoby  and  11.0 to  16.9
with Multicriteria.  In other words,  the rule does not correct the initial differences  in emissions due to the
baseline scenario.
The  three  rules,  in  fact,  have  slightly  different  behavior.  Since per capita GDP  enters  into  the
computation of the rate,  Jacoby tends to be stricter for developed countries,  and slightly more lenient for
developing countries.  The figures for the USA illustrate that point. Second, the Jacoby scheme is devised
so as to leave room for emission growth after regions have joined in (parameter y), while Multicriteria  and
Flatrate  force  quotas  to  decrease  from  the  start.  The  resulting  effort  is  always  comparable,  but  for
countries  with  low  or intermediate  per capita GDP,  Jacoby  creates  a  smoother transition.  Developing
nations and Economies in transition beneficiate,  at least in the short and medium term.
Multicriteria,  on  the other hand,  can only  generate decreasing  quotas.  As Jacoby,  it tends to be more
constraining on high emitting, rich and carbon intensive  countries.  For OECD countries,  the rate at which
their quota diminish under that rule increases  over time as developing regions come in and push down the
averages for the three parameters under consideration.Lecocq, Crassous  /International Climate  regime beyond 2012  23
But at least relative to  Contraction and Convergence  and per capita,  Jacoby,  Multicriteria and Flatrate
are quasi-identical.  In other words,  what matters  for the negotiation  is not which rule is selected, but  the
date at which developing  countries join the coordination.  This shows the critical  importance of the rules
governing  entry and  initial  quota,  a point  that  is  often overlooked  when  the schemes  are  discussed  in
abstracto.
6.3.  Regional quota allowances
Regarding  regional  allowance  of quota, the  only additional  point  we need to make  is that  under Per
Capita  and Contraction and Convergence,  developing countries are awarded excess  allowances  compared
to  their baseline.  As Figure  9 demonstrates,  this occurs  immediately  under a per capita allocation,  and
later  on in the contraction and convergence  case.  In both cases,  the volumes of "tropical  hot air" can be
very  significant,  up  to  2 GtC  on  average  or  25%  of the  World's  total  allowed  emissions  under  these
rules'5.
It  is important  to note that tropical  hot air is  not reserved  to  scenarios  where the overall  baseline  is
already very low such as ICI  or IC2.  On the contrary,  it stems from the very  structure of the Per Capita
and Contraction and Convergence rules, and thus appears  in all scenarios.  In fact, it would require  a very
low  per capita allowance  level  (basically  below  current  per capita emissions  level  in  developing
countries),  to  make  tropical  hot  air  disappear.  It  thus  constitutes  a  significant  part  of the  rent  for
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Figure  9: Annual volume of "tropical hot air" distributed  in the IA1 scenario, under per capita and
Contraction and Convergence rules.
15  Potential  "hot air" in Russia and Economies  in transition  for the first conmnitment  period  is estimnated between  422
and 600 MtC per year (UNFCCC, 2001)24  Lecocq and Crassos /  International Climate Regime beyond 2012
7.  Price of allowances
We now turn  on to the economical  consequences of each  rule, starting with  the price of allowances.
Figure  10  shows the evolution of the international  price of allowances  over time in the Jacoby  (taken as
representative of Multicriteria and Flatrate), Per Capita and Contraction  and Convergence cascs.
Let us first look at the Kyoto period.  If we exclude  the top three points, which assume very high (and
probably unlikely)  emission  growth rates in Europe and Japan from now on to 2010  (scenarios IS92a, e
and f), the price of allowances  (also called price of carbon) in the first commitment period ranges from $0
to  $68/tC'  . These  values  - which  stem  from  the  uncertainty  on  baselines  and  do  not  incorporate
uncertainty  on abatement  costs - are  consistent  with the range of projections  in the literature  (see e.g.
Jotzo and Michaelowa, 2002 and Den Elzen and de Moor, 2002) and on line with the findings of a survey
of  expectations  by  main  market  players  for  prices  around  $40/tC  (Natsource,  2002)'7.  This  result,
however,  only provides  comfort  in the  internal  consistency  of our  model,  but does  not constitute  an
independent validation since the EPPA curves are used in the referenced studies.
Beyond 2012,  market  dynamics  are  widely different  depending  on  the  rule.  In the  contraction  and
convergence  case, prices rise quasi linearly from one commitment  period to the next, reaching  $0-$95 in
the second commitment  period (average  $52), $0-$180 ($76) in the fourth and $0-$360 ($165) in 2048-
2052.  This  trajectory  reflects  the shape  of the global  emission  envelope,  in  which  emissions  are  first
allowed  to  rise  and  then  decreases  after  2020,  thus  tightening  the  constraint  only progressively  with
regard to the baseline.
Under the per capita rule, prices are already very high in the second commitment  ($0-$162, av.$102  in
the second commitment  period), but they grow only lightly from then on to the ninth commitment period
(range $0-$358, average  $122  in 2050).  The reason is that per capita  does not incorporate  a transitional
period.
Price trajectories  in the Jacoby case are very different.  In most scenarios, prices present huge spikes (up
to $350 for the most pessimistic  scenario)  and then decrease  sharply.  The reason is that the composition
of the market changes  over time.  As economies  in transition and developing  countries join, a new supply
of low-cost abatement potential becomes available. For CPA and SAS, this effect is large enough to more
than offset the additional costs induced by the tightening target: as a result, the price drops.
In reality,  several factors might concur to mitigate  price  spikes.  First, should a mechanism similar to
the CDM  be introduced,  regions  will be able to  tap at least part of the low cost abatement  potential  in
regions without quotas, thus lowering the price. However,  as we have mentioned  above, to which extent
project-based  mechanisms  can provide  large supply  is  unclear.  Second, banking  would allow forward-
looking decision makers to prepare  for the constraint.  At the extreme, perfect intertemnporal  exchange of
allowances  coupled  with  perfect  foresight  by  all players  would  result  in a price  rising at  the  rate of
16 The  price  is  zero  when the  excess  supply of allowances  by  EEU and  FSU (the  so-called  "hot  air")  exceeds  the
combined demand  from WEU, JPN  and CANZ.  Although  this is the correct  price of the global  constraint,  it does not
necessarily reflect the effective price that sellers will ask for. In particular, monopostic behavior are not taken into account
in our model.
17 Allowances  on the  UK  market  currently  trade  around  $60/tC,  but the  market  is  limited.  Project-based  emission
reductions trade between $1 and $25 per tC (Lecocq and Capoor, 2002).Lecocq, Crassous  /International Climate  regime beyond 2012  25
discount regardless  of the initial distribution18. Third, preliminary results  with an alternative model  where
long-term  impacts  of  abatement  are  taken  into  account  confirm  that  price  spikes  would  be  greatly
mitigated.
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Figures  10: Allowance  price for the Per Capita, Contraction and Convergence  and Jacoby rules.
However,  these price  spikes  still  reveal  a key constraint  of all the  schemes  in which not all regions
participate  in the allowance  market from the start: tensions are likely to  arise when the market does not
enlarge  rapidly  enough.  This  suggests  in  turn  that  OECD  countries  have  an  interest  in  bringing
developing  countries  in,  and  that  some  win-win  opportumities  can  be  found  (at  least  assuming  that
developed countries are willing to act). We come back to this point below.
Last,  we  see  that  for  all  the  rules,  uncertainty  on  prices  is  very  high.  Table  6  summarizes  this
information for two periods, 2015  and 2050.  For each period,  two values  are  provided:  horizontally,  the
price  range  translates  the impact of the choice of rule on the price.  Vertically,  the price range translates
the impact of the scenario  on the formation of the price.
'' However,  unrestricted  banking would also allow Parties  to delay effort indefinitely. The above  argument  is thus only
valid  with  perfect  compliance.  The  economics  of banking without  that  assumption  is beyond  the scope  of the present
paper.26  Lecocq and Crausow / International  Climate  Regime beyond 2012
For 2015,  the largest uncertainty  is observed for the Jacoby rule.  Presence / absence of key  player in
the market combined with initial quota explain why this rule comes first. The impact of scenario on prices
for contraction and convergence  and for Per Capita is lower,  but still significant (about $150). The inpact
of the rule at a given scenario is very variable, but in the same order of magnitude.
In 2050 on the other hand, uncertainty  stems almost entirely from the scenario,  and very little from the
nature of the rule. Apart from the A2  case, which  is special because South Asia (SAS) has not entered in
the market by 2050, thus inflating the price, all other scenarios show ranges below $100.  Vertically on the
other hand, ranges of prices reach at least three times that value. In other words, for the ninth comrnitment
period, and for a given  environmental  objective,  the uncertainty on prices  stems almost entirely from the
scenario, and not so much from the quota allocation  rule, at least within the set we  selected here.
Scenano  Allowance Price in 2015 (2000$)  Allowance Price in 2050 (2000$)
Jacoby  C&C  Per Cap  min  max  range  Jacoby  C&C  Per Cap  min  max  range
IAI  151  41  97  41  151  109  168  141  71  71  168  97
IA2  187  63  118  63  187  124  233  233  178  178  233  .55
IA3  65  0  43  0  65  65  70  37  0  0  70  70
IB  112  8  65  8  112  104  77  74  4  4  77  73
IS98AIB  290  85  125  85  290  205  268  294  201  201  294  93
IS98AIF  311  93  159  93  311  217  338  358  364  338  364  26
IS98AIT  279  73  115  73  279  206  223  227  129  129  227  98
IS98A2  247  25  72  25  247  221  612  251  138  138  612  474
IS98B1  174  0  58  0  174  174  154  82  89  82  154  72
IS98B2  156  29  93  29  156  128  96  89  59  59  96  37
EPAI  259  62  123  62  259  197  228  201  162  162  228  66
EPA2  263  94  159  94  263  168  195  223  222  195  223  28
EPA3  274  95  150  95  274  180  201  249  219  201  249  48
EPA4  287  47  114  47  287  240  294  194  146  146  294  148
EPA5  246  32  82  32  246  214  253  186  80  80  253  173
EPA6  291  76  136  76  291  215  223  234  198  198  234  36
EPA7  244  61  121  61  244  184  220  200  162  162  220  58
IS92A  255  81  136  81  255  174  158  181  132  132  181  49
IS92B  145  55  110  55  145  90  133  154  106  106  154  49
IS92C  104  0  46  0  104  104  0  0  0
IS92D  145  0  67  0  145  145  65  0  41  0  65  65
IS92E  351  158  208  158  351  193  238  293  241  238  293  55
IS92F  331  141  162  141  331  191  171  238  114  114  238  124
min  65  0  43  65  0  0
max  351  158  208  612  358  364
range  286  158  165  548  358  364
Table 6: Minimum, maximum  and average  equilibrium price of  allowances for Jacoby,  Contraction
and Convergence and Per  Capita in 2015 (left) and 2050 (right).Lecocq, Crassous  /International Climate regime beyond 2012  27
. Net costs and benefits of clmate policies
Figure  11  presents the net annual costs of the climate policy (domestic abatement expenditures  plus net
costs of trading  on the international  carbon  market)  for  each region and  each of the above  three nies
(Flatrate, Contraction and convergence and Per capita).
l.1.  Regional  costs and beneits
Let us  first  read  the  figure  vertically.  For  Per  Capita  allocation,  the results  follow  intuition.  Tight
quotas for OECD countries, wide discrepancies between abatement costs in the developed and developing
world and large volumes of "tropical hot air" lead to  large-scale purchases of allowances  from the North,
and large scale money transfers in retun.
Contraction  and  convergence  leads  to  similar  costs  and  benefits.  However,  as  noted  above,  the
constraint  is lower  during  the first commitment  periods.  Hence lower  net costs and  lower net benefits
compared toper  capita in most regions.
For Flatrate, the results are slightly more complex to interpret because the number of regions within the
market  changes  over time,  depending on the baseline  scenario.  In almost  all  cases, Japan and  Westem
Europe end up with high bills because their constraint is tight and their domestic abatement too high.  In
general,  Eastern  Europe  and  the  CANZ region  also end  up  losing  money,  although  they  usually  sell
permits:  their total  domestic  abatement  costs  are still higher than the revenue they get from  selling the
permits. It is only in the scenarios where developing  countries enter very faraway  in the future that they
get to sell the most at the highest price, and thus make a profit. The same logic applies to the USA, which
has the additional advantage  of having its base emissions dependent on its baseline  for 2010. The region
thus ends up net seller  in most  scenarios during  the first commitment  period, and high prices of carbon
ensures it makes an overall profit. Forner Soviet Union, to a lesser degree, follows the same path.
In the developing world, Centrally Planned Asia is the only net beneficiary, because  it enters relatively
early  in the market and can therefore  act  as seller of low-cost emission  reductions.  Sub-Saharan  Africa
basically never participates,  and Latin America,  is either net winner  or loser,  depending  on the price of
carbon.  South Asia,  surprisingly, stands to lose much in some scenarios.  The reason is that this region is
often  assumed to  experience  a very  fast  economic  and  emissions growth  period  starting  on or around
2020.  However,  in some  scenarios,  it  crosses  the per capita GDP  threshold  at the  beginning  of that
growth  period,  and  has  thus  to  reduce  its  emissions  by a  large  volume,  resulting  in net  costs  to  its
economy.28  Lecocq and Crassous /International Climate Regime  beyond 2012
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Table  7 presents  the range  of annual  net transfers from OECD to developing  countries as a result of
purchases of  allowances  (in b$ per year) in Flatrate, Per Capita and Contraction and Convergence.
Flatrate  Per capita  C&C
2015  2040  2015  2040  2015  2040
CPA  O to  -0,5 to -+477  0 to +226  -10 to +453  0 to +11I  0 to +449
SAS  O to  -8 to +191  0 to +252  0 to +483  0 to +43  0 to +385
ROA  O to O  -7 to +28  0 to +55  0 to +80  0 to +11  0 to +70
MENA  -17toO  -358to0  Oto+1,5  -255to  0  -22to0  -226to0
SAFR  O toO  O toO  O to +158  0 to +361  0 to +17  0 to +333
LAM  O to +65  -56 to +172  0 to +64  0 to +98  0 to +13  0 to +91
Table 7: Annual transfer  range to developing countries (billions of USS) for three rules.
In most cases, transfers in the median  scenario are  far below the maximum depicted  here. Still,  these
figures  are very  large  compared  to current  flows  of ODA and  Foreign Direct Investment.  And even if
prices were divided by 10 (a ratio projection to realized consistent with the S02 case, Joskow et al.,  1998)
the figures  would still  be considerable,  and would raise  evident  political  acceptability  issues.  But they
also lead to  questioning the  validity of the underlying abatement costs curves  in the first place.  Can we
assume that there is such a gap in abatement costs between the developed world and developing countries,
especially in the long run, that would justify such transfers?
The  cases of China and  India are particularly  interesting.  EPPA,  as  all  the model  we  are aware  of,
assume that costs are very low in these regions which would consequently  benefit from huge transfers to
these regions. Some elements suggest that there is indeed vast low-cost abatement potential. For example,
EA (2001,  p.107) forecasts that China will require about $600b of investment in power generation  alone
over the next 20 years to meet its demand. Similarly, half of the lodging in 2015 is yet to be built (World
Bank,  2002  p.179).  But  what  happens  in  the  other  sectors,  and what  happens  beyond  the  2000-2020
period is unclear.
8.2.  Preferences  among rules
Reading Figure  11 horizontally  shows for each Party what is the least cost rule without consideration of
climate benefits.  The complete results with the five rules for both the second commitment period (myopic
approach) and the whole 2013-2052  period are presented in Tables 8 and 9 below, but the graphs convey
the main messages.
First, for 2015, the pattern is as follows:
*  If the cost of carbon  is  retained as a  good cost indicator,  the USA  strongly prefer  a rule with
initial quota based on past baseline emissions (Flatrate, Jacoby or Multicriteria)  to take profit of its
high emissions during the first commitment  period. But this in turn illustrates how attractive  it might
be for non Annex B Parties generally to raise their emissions before they enter the system.
*  Other OECD countries  see  contraction  and convergence  as  the  least-cost  option.  In that  case,
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to  tap low  cost  potentials  in  developing  countries  because  of the  presence  of all  regions  in  the
market from the start.
o  Flatrate (or Jacoby or Multicriteria)  is the obvious  least-cost option for Former Soviet Union, and
to a lower degree for Eastern Europe in 2015 because under these rules no action is required at all
o  Unsurprisingly,  all developing  regions  (except Middle  East and  Northern  Africa  and to a lesser
degree  Latin  America)  favor per capita allocation,  which  provides  them  with  the  highest  net
revenue  (the  price  decrease  due  to  tropical  hot  air  is  more  than  compensated  by  the  additional
volume  of sales they realize).  Contraction  and convergence  is their second choice,  suggesting that
some convergence of interests with non US OECD.
In  short, this description  unsurprisingly confinns that North and South have conflicting interests vis-a-
vis abatement rules, but it also reveals what might be a very wide gap among Northern  nations if the US
does not participate in the first commitment period.
Scenario  USA  CANz  JPN  WEU  EEU  FSU  CPA  SAS  ROA  MENA  SAFR  LAM
IAI  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
1A2  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Flatmte  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
IA3  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
IB  CC  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
ICI  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate
IC2  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatate
AIB  MultiCnt  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
AIF  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  PerCap  PerCap  CC  Per Cap  PerCap
AIT  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  PerCap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
A2  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  CC  CC  Jacoby  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
B I  Flatrate  Jacoby  CC  CC  Jacoby  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
B2  Flatrate  Jacoby  CC  CC  Jacoby  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPAI  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPA2  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPA3  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPA4  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPA5  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPA6  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPA7  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap
IS92a  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Flatrate  Per Cep  Per Cap
IS92b  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap
IS92c  Flatrate  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap
IS92d  Flatrate  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
IS92e  Flatrate  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
IS92f  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Flatrate  Per Cep  Per Cap  Per Cap  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap
Table 8: Least-cost optionfor  Parties  in 2015.32  Lecocq and Crassous  /International Climate  Regime beyond 2012
USA  CANz  JPN  WEU  EEU  FSU  CPA  SAS  ROA  MENA  SAFR  LAM
IWAI  MultiCrit  CC  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
IWA2  MultiCnt  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
IWA3  Flatrate  CC  Flatrate  Flatrate  Jacoby  MultiCrit  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
IWB  MultiCrit  CC  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
IWCI  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate
IWC2  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate  Flatrate
IMAIB MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
IMAIF  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
IMAIT  MultiCrit  MultbCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
IMA2  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  CC  CC  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
IMB I  Flatrate  MultiCnt  MultiCrit  CC  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
IMB2  Flatrate  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPAI  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPA2  MultiCrit  MultCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPA3  MultiCrit  MultbCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  Jacoby  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPA4  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPA5  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Jacoby
EPA6  MultiCnt  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
EPA7  MultiCrit  CC  MultiCrit  CC  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
ISA  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
ISB  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  CC  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
ISC  Flatrate  CC  CC  CC  CC  Flatrate  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap
ISD  Flatrate  CC  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
ISE  MultiCrit  CC  CC  MultiCrit  MultiCrit  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  CC  Per Cap  Per Cap
ISF  MultiCrit  CC  CC  CC  Jacoby  Jacoby  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap  Per Cap
Table 9: Least  cost option  for Parties  over 2008-2052  period.
When  considering  the  whole  2013-2052  period,  choices  are  rather  different,  as  shown  in  Table  9
below, where the rule with lowest total discounted  costs over the whole time horizon are reported'9. The
most  important  variation  concerns  non  US  OECD,  which  is  now  uncertain  between  contraction  and
convergence and multicriteria. The reason is that for those regions, in the long run, the benefits from trade
do not offset the costs of more stringent requirements any longer.
Let us conclude  by looking at each column in Tables 8 and 9  vertically:  for most regions,  the ranking
of rules remains largely constant across  scenarios, especially when considering that Flatrate, Multicriteria
and Jacoby  are essentially  identical.  The only exceptions  are the Middle  East and North Africa region in
the  first  table,  which  is  a  very  particular  case  because  of relatively  high  GDP  level  and very  high
emissions level, and non-US OECD regions  at second period,  where the preference  between contraction
and contraction and Multicriteria depends on the baseline scenario. This suggests that the it is not so much
the choice of quota allocation  rule which is impacted by uncertainty on baseline scenarios,  but rather the
price to pay for accepting any given rule, as we have shown at the end of the preceding section.
19  The discount rate is considered  constant and equal to 5%. We performed some  calculations with differentiated  rates
among regions, according to very different rates of  growth, but it did not provide significant differences in these results.Lecocq, Crassous  /International  Climate regime beyond 2012  33
9.  Conclusion
In this paper,  we have  reviewed  the main rules proposed  m the literature  to allocate  GHG emission
quotas amongst nations beyond 2012 and, using a partial equilibrium model of the allowance market, we
have  examined  the  economic  consequences  of the  adoption  of five  of them  under  a  wide  range  of
plausible  baseline  scenarios.  This  analysis  highlights  four  key  characteristics  of  quantity-based
coordination under uncertainty, and provides  insights on some of the difficulties  and opportunities Parties
will face in the incoming negotiations on the international climate mitigation regime beyond Kyoto.
First,  four out of the five quota allocation rules we have tested do not completely control quantities,
either  because  not  all  Parties take  emission  comnmitments  in 2013,  or because  quotas  depend  on the
baseline,  or  both.  The  contraction  and  convergence  example  demonstrates  that this  is  by no  means
inevitable,  but the price  to pay  is twofold:  all countries  need to join in 2013,  and the global  emissions
envelope must be negotiated separately.  Otherwise,  cunulative  emissions over the 2012-2052 period can
vary significantly  (up to 25%). A small range probably compared to what a price-based instrument would
lead to over the sarne period of time, but large  enough to  limit the environmental  attractiveness of the
scheme.
In terms of prices,  our analysis  confirms the early intuition of Hourcade (1994)  that regardless  of the
quota allocation rle selected, prices of  allowances and net costs ofclimate mitigation  for all Parties  are
very  sensitive to  the uncertainty on  baseline, and  potentially  very  large  under  the  highest  emissions
scenarios.  This constitutes  a strong barrier  against the adoption  of any  of these schemes. Beyond  early
entry of developing  countries  in  the market,  which mitigates  costs,  the ranges of variations  we  obtain
(even when all countries join in 2013) suggest that some form of price cap might be necessary to reassure
Parties; for example through taxes on excess emissions,  as in the current Danish regime or in the "safety
valve"  proposal  by  Kopp  et  al.  (2000).  More  research  is  required  to  assess  how  uncertain  the
environmental outcome would then become.
On the other hand, despite the high impact of uncertainty on prices and costs, the  preferences of Paries
among rndes appear  rather  insensitive to uncertainty on the baseline  scenario,  at least with the abatement
costs and global  environmental  objective we  have  selected.  In fact, configurations  where  the least-cost
rule depends  on Parties expectations  about future growth or future  enissions emerge very rarely in  our
simulations. As a result, the risk that Parties make strategic use of uncertainty in the negotiations (Allais,
1953) appear to be low as long as the basic choice between joining the international  coordination  or not
has been made.
Fourth,  our  analysis  demonstrates  that  the  ruies governing the  entry  of new  parties into  the
coordination are critical. It will come as no surprise that perverse  incentives  arise when the first quota
depends  on future emissions  (i.e.  beyond  2002); and our contribution  here  is simply to demonstrate  the
magnitude of this risk in schemes such as Flatrate, Jacoby or Multicriteria where the initial distribution of
quota is not significantly altered over time, hence perpetuating  the benefits of high initial emissions. Less
intuitive,  on the  other hand,  is  the fact  that  the timing  of entry  matters  so  much.  The reason  is that,
because of the wide gap between abatement costs in developed and developing countries embedded in the
marginal  abatement  cost  curves  we  have  used, prices  and  total  costs can  significantly  decrease  when
developing  countries join, even if the global constraint on emissions is tightened at the same time.
The last observation has wide ranging implications.  First,  it suggests  that the current  debate on quota
allocation rules focuses too much on quota allocation per  se, and overlooks elements that are may be just34  Lecocq and Cmssous /International  Climate Regime beyond 2012
as important.  For example,  based on the sole formula for quota allocation, the Jacoby, Multicriteria  and
Flatrate  rules are usually  considered  no less  distinct than,  say, Flatrate  and Per Capita.  But numerical
analysis  reveals  they are  in fact quasi-identical  if used with the same per capita GDP  threshold,  at least
compared to Per Capita or Contraction and Convergence.
But  it  also  points  to  a  possible  win-win  compromise  between  North  and  South,  where  early
participation  in the allowance  market,  and possibly some hot air for the  South would be  traded against
tighter  commitments  in  the North.  The  contraction  and  convergence  rule, which  is  the  first choice of
Europe and Japan, and the second choice of most developing  countries,  is an illustration.  Of course, our
analysis also demonstrates that North-South purchases of allowances would be very significant compared
to current  foreign direct investment,  raising obvious political  acceptability  issues. But assuming enough
willingness  to pay for the environment  and maybe  some  form of price  cap,  developed  and developing
countries would both be better off.
However,  at the heart of this possible compromise  is the assumption that abatement costs in the South
are significantly  lower than  in the North,  and that this difference  will be sustained  over time.  Although
common  in climate mitigation  policy models,  this hypothesis  is still based on limited evidence.  Priority
for future  research  should  thus  be  to  discuss  and  refine  it,  and  to assess  to  which  extent  the  above
convergence  of interests  would  still  emerge  if the  gap  in  abatement  costs  were  not  as  wide  or as
permanent as expected.Lecocq, Crassous  /International Climate  regime beyond 2012  35
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Appendix: Data harmonization of baseline  scenarios
The 25  selected  original  scenarios  are based  on  different regional  patterns, as  described  in table  Al
below:
IIASA WEC 98  IMAGE  EPA 98  is92
NAM  USA  USA  USA
CAN
West Europe  OCDE Europe  OCDE West  OCDE West
East Europe  Eastem Europe  EFSU  EFSU
FSU  Former USSR
South Asia  South Asia
CP Asia  East Asia  CP Asia  CP Asia
South East Asia  South East Asia  South East Asia
OCDE Pacific  Oceania  OCDE Asia  OCDE Pacific
Other Pacific  Japan
Latin America  Latin  America  (2  Latin America  Latin America
parts)
Africa  Africa  (4 parts)  Africa  Africa
North  Africa  & Middle  Middle East  Middle East  Middle East
East
Table Al: Regional aggregation  patterns  of the  four sources of  scenarios
To  harmonize  regions  across  scenarios,  we  use  a  disaggregation  - reaggregation  process.
Disaggregation  of a region  R (say  North America  in the IIASAWEC  set) into  sub-regions  Rl  and R2
(USA and Canada) is performed as follows. We look for similar scenarios (in terms of population,  GDP
and emission trajectories) where RI  and R2 and isolated,  and we deduce from this reference  the shares of
RI and R2 in total population, GDP and emissions of R. Table A2 summarizes which regions were cut in
two pieces.Lecocq, Crassous  /lInternatonal  Climate regime  beyond 2012  39
EPA 98
IIASA WEC 98  IMAGE  IS  98
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _is  9 2
Original  Adapted  Original  Adapted  Original  Adapted
jsj+ica  2  t1  USA--<-1i-4  wd  ~  USA  USA  , tIJSA  > 
9tX.,,  jCA2,  ,  PW  <v$;  so  CAN  CAN  - * 
West Europe  West Europe  OECD  West Europe  OECD  West Europe
Europe  West
Eastem Europe  Eastem Europe  Easter  Eastern  Europe  EFS  -
Europe  __  _  _  _  _  _  _
FSU  FSU  FSU  FSU  .___________
CP Asia  CP Asia  East Asia  East Asia  CP Asia
South Asia  South Asia  South Asia  South Asia  i SE Asi'q  A
Other Pacific  RO Asia  South  East  RO Asia (I)  I  -,.
Asia  -
Middle  East  +  Middle  East  +  Middle East  Middle  East  +  -d4i-  '  4dst
North Africa  North Africa  North Africa  North Africa  E
SubSaharnan  SubSaharian  East Africa  SubSahanan  "A  'cp  SubShart:
Africa  Africa  Africa
South Africa  A.r  '_




Table A2: Disaggregation  process
We must stress that the harmonization  is not perfect, and some slight disparities remain.
Turkey is  included in  Western  Europe  in scenarios  from IIASA-WEC,  EPA and  IS92, and  to region
MENA  in  the IS98-IMAGE  scenarios.  But  differences  in  regional  GDP in  1990  from  these  different
models show that the influence of Turkey  is not significant considering  the original  differences  in GDP
estimations over the whole region:
The disaggregation  of Asia is  the most  intricate  and  variable  among  models:  IS98-IMAGE  include
three  zones  build on  geographical  criteria,  whereas  other models  gather  centrally  planned  countries.
However,  regions  East Asia from  IMAGE and Centrally planned Asia in other modeling approaches  all
include  China as the major country, differences  concern Taiwan, Vietnam,  Cambodia.  We decided not to
modify these defaults, since our modifications would affect slightly the storylines behind the scenarios.
Reference year harmonization.
Since  1990 and 2000 data are inconsistent across the four scenario  families we use, we  normalized all
2000 population  and GDP across  all  scenarios  based on World  Bank data,  and  on  1998 data  from  the
International  Energy  Agency  for fossil  CO2 emissions.  We  recomputed  the  scenarios  based on  these
values, and on the original growth rates.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
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